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HEDONIC DAMAGES IN SECTION 1983 ACTIONS: A
REMEDY FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DEPRIVATION OF LIFE
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code' provides a federal
cause of action for violations of a person's federally protected civil rights.
2
Litigation involving claims under section 1983 has increased dramatically in
recent years.' Damage awards for successful plaintiffs in section 1983 actions
are often substantial and provide a lucrative incentive to pursue a section
1983 claim. 4 A plaintiff bringing a section 1983 action must show that some
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id; see infra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of § 1983); infra note 4 and
accompanying text (noting examples of § 1983 claims and damage awards in § 1983 actions);
infra note 5 and accompanying text (defining § 1983 terms "person," and "under color of
law").
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638 (1980) (§ 1983
protects people's liberties and rights); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658, 685 (1978) (§ 1983 is remedy for violations of civil rights); Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972) (§ 1983 empowers federal courts as guardians of people's constitutional
rights); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (§ 1983 enforces provisions of fourteenth
amendment). Congress passed the prior version of § 1983, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871
(Klan Act), in response to President Grant's March 23, 1871, message to Congress in which
President Grant recommended that Congress pass legislation to curb the rampant violations
of life, liberty, and property occurring at the time. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171-73 (discussing
provisions of Klan Act); Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (current version of §
1 of Klan Act at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). The official title of the Klan Act denotes that the
act enforces the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; see Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 (discussing
purpose of Klan Act); see also infra note 6 and accompanying text (noting provisions of
fourteenth amendment to United States Constitution). In Monell, the United States Supreme
Court noted that Congress enacted § 1 of the Klan Act to provide a "broad remedy" for
violations of individuals' civil rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 685; Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch.
22, 17 Stat. 13; see infra note 5 and accompanying text (defining § 1983 terms "persons,"
and "color of law,"); infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussing compensatory and
deterrent purposes of § 1983).
3. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 533 & n.20 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (expressing concern over tremendous increase in number of civil rights actions
and burden that these often trivial cases place on federal courts); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 553-54 & n.13 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting increasing § 1983 litigation and
suggesting revision and clarification of purpose of § 1983); Love, Damages: A Remedy For
the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CAUF. L. Rav., 1242, 1242 & n.6 (1979) (discussing
rise in number of § 1983 actions). In 1960, plaintiffs filed 280 § 1983 lawsuits. Id. The number
of § 1983 lawsuits increased from 3,985 in 1970, to 12,313 in 1977. Id.
4. See Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 559 & 571-73 (Ist Cir. 1985) (awarding
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person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitu-
tional or federal statutory right.5 The fourteenth amendment to the United
$177,040 damages for physical and psychological problems arising from unconstitutional body
cavity strip search); Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 10-14 (1st Cir. 1983) (awarding $60,000
compensatory and $15,000 punitive damages for injuries caused when crime lab officials used
chemical tests involving known carcinogens on plaintiff's skin); Green v. Francis, 705 F.2d
846, 850 (6th Cir. 1983) (awarding $63,000 damages for failure of sheriff's department to
respond to terrorism committed against black family's property); Grimm v. Leinart, 705 F.2d
179, 183 (6th Cir. 1983) (awarding $60,000 damages f6r false arrest, false imprisonment, and
damage to reputation), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984); Thomas v. City of New Orleans,
687 F.2d 80, 82 & 84 (5th Cir. 1982) (awarding $50,000 punitive damages for wrongful
discharge from police department).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). In Gomez v. Toledo, the United States Supreme Court
maintained that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must allege only that some person deprived the
plaintiff of a federal right and that the person acted under color of state law. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution
bars suits against a state in federal court by citizens of another state or citizens of the defendant
state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (barring citizen of one state from filing action against another
state in federal court); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9-21 (1889) (citizen of defendant state
cannot file suit against defendant state in federal court). For the purposes of § 1983, the term
"person" does not include a state, a state agency, or a state official. See Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 337-49 (1979) (state agency not "person" under § 1983); Edeman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (state officials sued in official capacity for monetary relief entitled
to invoke sovereign immunity). Although the eleventh amendment bar of actions in federal
courts against states includes state officials that a plaintiff sues in official capacity, the Supreme
Court has held that plaintiffs may sue state officials in federal court for injunctive relief or
for a declaratory order compelling compliance with the United States Constitution. Ex pare
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-68 (1908). Municipalities or local government entities, municipal
officials, and natural persons, however, are "persons" under § 1983. See Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In Monell, the United States Supreme
Court overruled the portion of the Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape in which the Court
held that a municipal entity was not a "person" under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 701; see
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (municipalities not "persons" for purposes of §
1983). See generally Schwartz, Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation, in SEcTION 1983 CnrM
RIGHTS LITIGATION 1985 11, 67-68, 94-109 (1985) (discussing § 1983 term "person" and
discussing state liability in § 1983 actions); Csvi ACTIONS AGAINST STATE GOVERMENT §§
10.3-10.7 (W. Winborne, ed. 1982) [hereinafter Crv. AcTIoNs] (defining "person" under § 1983).
In Monroe v. Pape, the United States Supreme Court maintained that a wrongdoer who
has abused powers state law vests in the wrongdoer is a person acting under color of state law
for the purposes of § 1983. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184. The Monroe Court used the phrase "clothed
with the authority of state law" to describe a person acting under color of state law. Id. See
generally Schwartz, supra at 69-84 (discussing § 1983 term "under color of law"); CrvM ACTIONS,
supra at § 10:11-10:13 (discussing § 1983 term "under color of law").
Section 1983 provides enforcement of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of section 1983);
infra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of fourteenth amendment). The
Supreme Court has held that the first, fourth, fifth (except the Grand Jury clause), sixth, and
eighth amendments to the United States Constitution apply to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382-87 (1927) (incorporating first
amendment freedom of speech under fourteenth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
660 (1961) (incorporating fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure
under fourteenth amendment); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969) (incorporating
fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy under fourteenth amendment); Klopfer v.
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States Constitution protects life. 6 Unconstitutional deprivations of life by
persons acting under color of state law, therefore, are actionable under
section 1983. 7 Although section 1983 provides a cause of action for depri-
vations of constitutional rights, section 1983 does not include provisions for
the survival of a cause.of action for the benefit of a decedent's estate when
the decedent dies after the cause of action has accrued, or when a decedent's
death directly results from a violation of the decedent's constitutional rights.s
Section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code, 9 however, provides
procedural guidelines for section 1983 actions.10 Section 1988 refers the
federal district courts to state law when federal law fails to carry out the
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-26 (1967) (incorporating sixth amendment right to speedy
trial under fourteenth amendment); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (incor-
porating eighth amendment freedom from cruel and unusual punishment under fourteenth
amendment); see also CIviL AcToNS, supra, § 10.9 (discussing enforcement of constitutional
amendments).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." Id.; see infra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing protection
of life that fourteenth amendment provides individuals).
7. See, e.g., Taylor v. Collins, 574 F. Supp. 1554, 1559-63 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (§ 1983
action appropriate for case in which police shot and killed individual without probable cause);
Hamrick v. Lewis, 515 F. Supp. 983, 987 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (§ 1983 cause of action when police
shot and killed individual who was attempting to destroy evidence); Phillips v. Ward, 415 F.
Supp. 976, 979-80 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (section 1983 action valid when police shot and killed
fleeing burglar when police had opportunity to effect arrest without deadly force). Many
deprivations of life, however, are not unconstitutional and therefore, are not actionable under
§ 1983. See, e.g., Quails v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976) (police officers not
liable under § 1983 for shooting kidnapping suspect after suspect attempted to run over officers
with automobile); Willis v. Tillrock, 421 F. Supp. 368, 372 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (police officer not
liable under § 1983 for killing burglary suspect when suspect lunged at police officer in dark area);
Smith v. Jones, 379 F. Supp. 201, 204 (M.D. Tenn. 1973) (police not liable under § 1983 for
killing attempted murder suspect after suspect attempted to run over police officer with
automobile), aff'd without opinion, 497 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1974).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing §
1983); infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing survival of § 1983 actions for
decedent's estate).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code provides
in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by
the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES,"
for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for
their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in
all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein
the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, . . . same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended
to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause. . ..
Id.
10. See id. (providing provisions of § 1988).
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purposes of section 1983, unless the state law is inconsistent with the United
States Constitution or federal law." The United States Supreme Court has
held that under section 1988, state survival of action statutes determine the
survival of section 1983 claims when a plaintiff dies after a plaintiff's section
1983 cause of action has accrued.' 2 The United States Supreme Court has
yet to decide, however, whether a state statute may bar a section 1983
action arising when the decedent's death is the result of the defendant's
unconstitutional activity.
3
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); see supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting provisions
of § 1988); see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588 (1978) (§ 1988 governs survival
of § 1983 actions); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 n.13 (1978) (noting that § 1988
authorizes federal courts to adopt state law for § 1983 remedies); McDonald v. Verble, 622
F.2d 1227, 1234-35 (6th Cir. 1980) (§ 1983 rule of damages, even if federal court adopts
damage remedy from state law, is federal rule to redress violations of federal rights).
12. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 584-95 (state survival of action statutes determine survival
of § 1983 actions). In Robertson, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a
decedent's § 1983 claim arising from bad faith prosecution survived the decedent's death. Id.
at 586-88. The decedent's cause of action for bad faith prosecution arose before the decedent's
death and the bad faith prosecution did not contribute to the decedent's death in any way.
Id. Noting that § 1988 requires federal courts to apply state survival law for § 1983 actions
unless the state law interferes with the policies of section 1983, the Supreme Court held that
the survival laws in the state where the decedent's cause of action arose did not interfere with
the policies of § 1983, even though the state law prohibited the survival of bad faith prosecution
claims. Id. at 590-95. The Robertson Court refused, however, to decide whether state survival
law could cause a § 1983 action that arose from a constitutional deprivation to abate. Id. at
594; see infira notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing survival of § 1983 actions arising
from unconstitutional deprivation of decedent's life). State survival statutes provide for the
survival of a decedent's cause of action for the benefit of a decedent's estate after the death
of the decedent. See 2 S. SPImsER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGOUL DEATH § 14.1 (2d ed. 1975)
(discussing survival of action laws). Under the legal fiction of state survival statutes, a decedent's
estate stands in the place of the decedent collecting the debts the decedent is owed. Id. State
wrongful death statutes generally provide recovery for a decedent's survivors' losses resulting
from the decedent's death. See id. (providing an exhaustive review of state wrongful death
and survival statutes and the claims allowed under these statutes).
13. See Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183, 184-89 (1977) (dismissing certiorari as
improvidently granted because questions presented to the Court differed from questions raised
at oral argument). In Jones, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a state
damage recovery limitation could limit § 1983 damages for an action arising from the
unconstitutional deprivation of the decedent's life. Id. The petitioner in Jones, the mother of
the decedent police wrongfully killed, sought damages for the loss of her son's life. Id. The
Jones Court found, however, that the petitioner's question presented at oral argument before
the Court concerned the decedent's mother's loss of her child's right to raise the child, while
the petition for certiorari to the Court presented a question concerning damages for the
deprivation of the decedent's life. Id. Finding that the question presented at oral argument
was not the same question which petitioner's counsel presented in the petition for certiorari,
the Jones Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted and refused to decide the
relationship between state law and § 1983. Id.
The dissent in Jones called for resolution of the questions surrounding the applicability
of state survival statues and damage remedies in § 1983 actions arising from unconstitutional
deprivations of life. Id. at 189-96 (White, J., dissenting); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 25-30 (1980) (Powell, J. concurring) (intimating that state survival law should not prohibit
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Although the United States Supreme Court has not clarified the surviv-
ability of section 1983 actions arising from an unconstitutional deprivation
of a person's life, several federal courts have decided that state statutes
cannot bar a section 1983 action arising from unconstitutional activity that
results in a person's death.' 4 Finding that neither federal nor state law
provides an adequate damage remedy that reflects on the value of a
decedent's life, some federal courts have fashioned damages for the value
of a decedent's life in section 1983 actions arising from an unjustified
deprivation of a person's life.'5 The federal courts that have fashioned
damages for the value of a decedent's life have followed the United States
Supreme Court decision in Carey v. Piphus,16 which authorized federal
courts to fashion remedies that are appropriate to the particular injury in
section 1983 actions.' 7 The Carey Court considered a section 1983 claim
that arose when a public secondary school principal suspended a student
without procedural due process, in violation of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution. 8 The plaintiff in Carey maintained that
§ 1983 claim when § 1983 action arises from unconstitutional deprivation of decedent's life);
supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing state survival statutes and survival of § 1983
claims).
14. See eg., Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1220-24 (10th Cir. 1982) (state law cannot
prohibit § 1983 actions when § 1983 cause of action arises from decedent's death), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 821 (1983); Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 292-97 (D. Colo.
1982) (state law only may expand, not restrict, § 1983 remedies); Larson v. Wind, 542 F.
Supp. 25, 26-27 (N.D. I11. 1982) (state law cannot interfere with survival of § 1983 remedies
when unconstitutional conduct causes death); O'Conner v. Several Unknown Correctional
Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1347-49 (E.D. Va. 1981) (state law cannot deny recovery in §
1983 action for injuries deprivation of decedent's life causes); see also infra note 15 and
accompanying text (noting federal courts that have mandated survival of and have fashioned
remedies in § 1983 actions arising from unconstitutional deprivations of life); Annotation,
Survivability of Civil Rights Cause of Action Based on 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, 42 A.L.R. FED.
163, 172-78 (1979 & Supp. 1985) (discussing survival of § 1983 actions when plaintiff is dead).
15. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1240 (7th Cir. 1984) (fashioning
loss of life and loss of pleasure of living damage remedy in § 1983 action); Sherrod v. Berry,
629 F. Supp. 159, 163-64 (N.D. Ill. 1985), (fashioning "hedonic damages" in § 1983 action)
appeal docketed, No. 85-3151 (7th Cir. Dec. 12, 1985) ; Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F.
Supp. 1554, 1556-58 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (fashioning "deterrent damages" in § 1983 action);
Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167-68 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (fashioning loss of life
damages in § 1983 action); see also infra notes 56-103 and accompanying text (discussing
federal courts that have fashioned loss of life damage remedies in § 1983 actions).
16. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
17. Id. at 258-59; see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1946) (maintaining that federal
courts should use any remedy available to redress violations of federally protected rights);
infra notes 56-103 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of loss of life damages in §
1983 actions).
18. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 248-51. In Carey the United States Supreme Court
consolidated two § 1983 cases. Id. In the first case, a high school principal suspended respondent
Piphus when the principal suspected Piphus of smoking marijuana on school grounds. Id. In
the second case, a grade school principal suspended respondent Brisco for wearing an earring
in school. Id. Both respondents in Carey alleged that the school authorities violated the
fourteenth amendment by suspending the respondents without due process of law. Id.
19871
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substantial damages are appropriate in a constitutional deprivation action,
regardless of whether the plaintiff suffered actual injury. 19 Reasoning that
the primary purpose of section 1983 is compensation for actual injury, the
Carey Court rejected the plaintiff's argument. 2° The Carey Court noted that
substantial compensatory damages for actual injury also fulfill the section
1983 purpose of deterrence. 2' In addition, the Supreme Court in Carey
recognized that common law tort remedies may not always provide adequate
compensation in section 1983 actions. 22 The Carey Court, therefore, main-
tained that when existing federal and state law remedies are inadequate,
federal courts should fashion remedies in section 1983 actions to advance
the section 1983 policies of compensation and deterrence.
23
The decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois in Sherrod v. Berr)'4 provides an example of a federal court
fashioning a remedy in a section 1983 action that arose from an unjustified
deprivation of a decedent's life. 25 In Sherrod, the district court allowed the
jury to award damages for the "hedonic value" of the decedent's life.
26
The Sherrod court is apparently the first United States court to describe a
damage award for the value of a decedent's life as damages for the hedonic
value of a decedent's life. 27 The purpose of hedonic damages is to compen-
sate a decedent's estate for the decedent's loss of life and loss of the pleasure
of living. 28 The Sherrod court, therefore, recognized as actual injury the
loss of life and loss of the pleasure of living that a decedent sustains when
a wrongdoer unconstitutionally deprives the decedent of life.
29
Although the term "hedonic damages" is novel in American jurisprud-
ence, English courts for many years have awarded a distinct element of
damages commonly known as loss of expectation of life damages.30 Begin-
ning with the decision of the House of Lords in Rose v. Ford,3' English
courts interpreted section I of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
19. Id. at 254.
20. Id. at 254-57.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 258-59.
23. Id.
24. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-3151 (7th Cir. Dec. 12,
1985).
25. Id. at 162-64; see infra notes 81-103 and accompanying text (discussing Sherrod).
26. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. at 162-64.
27. See Blodgett, Hedonic Damages, 71 A.B.A.J. 25, 25 (February, 1985) (noting first
use of hedonic damages in Sherrod v. Berry); Tarr, Illinois Jury Awards 'Hedonic Damages',
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 3, col. 1 (discussing decision in Sherrod v. Berry and first use
of hedonic damages).
28. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162-64 (defining hedonic damages); infra text accom-
panying notes 92-96 (discussing term "hedonic damages" in Sherrod v. Berry).
29. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 164 (discussing damages for hedonic value of life).
30. See infra notes 30-44 and accompanying text (discussing English courts' experience
with loss of expectation of life damages).
31. Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826.
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Act of 19342 as allowing loss of expectation of life as a separate damage
award for a decedent's estate when a tortfeasor wrongfully curtailed a
decedent's life. aJ In subsequent decisions, English courts limited damage
awards for loss of expectation of life to a nominal amount.34 For example,
in Gammell v. Wilson, 3 the Court of Appeal stated that £ 1250 was the
proper award for loss of expectation of life, until inflation and monetary
values demanded another increase.3 6 The arbitrary figure of £ 1250 in
Gammell reflected the English courts' difficulty in assessing the value of human
life.3 ' The Gammell court, therefore, settled on a conventional sum for
32. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 41, § 1,
reprinted in 13 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 115 (3d ed. 1969). Section 1 of the Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act provides that all causes of action vesting in a decedent
prior to death shall survive for the benefit of the decedent's estate, with the exception of
causes of action for defamation, enticing away a spouse, seduction, or adultery. Id.
33. Rose, [1937] A.C. at 858-62. In Rose v. Ford, Lord Roche of the House of Lords
stated that estimating the value of life is difficult, but not impossible. Rose, [1937] A.C. at
859. Lord Roche suggested that courts should estimate the value of a decedent's life by
considering what life would have been worth to the decedent, without regarding the decedent's
income or financial prospects. Id. at 860-61. Lord Wright of the House of Lords stated in
Rose that in considering the proper amount of damages for a person's wrongfully shortened
life a jury should use common sense in awarding damages considering the various aspects of
life. Id. at 849-50. One commentator has noted that English courts' loss of expectation of life
damage awards are moderate and compensate the loss of prospective happiness rather than
loss of a certain length of days. SALMoND & HEUSTON, LAW OF TORTS 540-41 (18th ed. 1981).
Further, the commentator notes that in determining the loss of expectation of life damages,
neither the decedent's age, nor economic position is fundamentally significant. Id.; see 12
HALsBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND Damages 1148 (4th ed. 1975) (discussing methods of assessing
loss of expectation of life damages); see also Morgan v. Scoulding [1938] 1 K.B. 786, 791
(allowing decedent's estate £ 1000 in damages for decedent's loss of expectation of life when
decedent died instantaneously); Note, Compensation for Negligently Shortened Life Expectancy,
29 MD. L. Rav. 24, 24-30 (1969) (tracing growth of English loss of expectation of life damage
awards).
34. See, e.g., White v. London Transport Executive, [1982] 1 All E.R. 410, 412
(recognizing damage award of £ 1250 for decedent's loss of expectation of life); Kandalla v.
British Airways Board, [1980] 1 All E.R. 341, 352 (awarding decedents' estate conventional
sum £ 750 for loss of expectation of life); McCann v. Sheppard, [ 19731 1 W.L.R. 540, 546-
53 (reducing loss of expectation of life damage award to conventional sum of £ 750); Benham
v. Gambling, [1941] 1 All E.R. 7, 12-13 (noting speculation involved in assessing two and
one-half year old child's future happiness, court reduced loss of expectation of life award for
decedent's estate from £ 1200 to £ 200); J. CLERK & W. LiNDSELL, TORTS § 6-09 (15th ed.
1982) (noting that English courts assess loss of expectation of life damages at nominal
conventional sum); P. ATrYAH, ACCIDENTS, COim'ENsATION AND THE LAW 85, 182 (3d ed. 1980)
(noting that "modest conventional sum" for loss of expectation of life damages is approximately
£ 1500).
35. [1980] 2 All E.R. 557.
36. Id. at 567-68.
37. See id. (awarding £ 1250 for loss of expectation of life). The Court of Appeal in
Gammell v. Wilson stressed that loss of expectation of life damage awards should be uniform
among courts to avoid the difficulty of assessing the value of life in every case. Id.; see P.
ATn'AH, supra note 35, at 213-17 (discussing difficulty in assessing arbitrary damage awards
for intangible losses such as loss of expectation of life); Allen, Is Life a Boon?, 228 L.Q.
REv. 462, 462-65 (1941) (arguing that loss of expectation of life damages are too speculative,
if not impossible to measure).
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all loss of expectation of life awards. 38 On appeal, the House of Lords affirmed
the decision in Gammell, but encouraged Parliament to settle the confu-
sion surrounding the amount of damages that courts awarded to a decedent's
estate.39
Shortly after Gammell, the English Parliament enacted legislation that
amended the laws relating to damages for personal injury and wrongful
death.4 In the Administration of Justice Act of 1982 (Justice Act), 41
Parliament specifically abolished damages for loss of expectation of life.42
The Justice Act, however, includes a decedent's awareness of shortened life
expectancy prior to death as a factor in the damage element of pain and
suffering.43 Shortened life expectancy, therefore, is no longer a separate
element of damages in England, although a plaintiff's knowledge of short-
ened life expectancy is a factor for English courts to consider when awarding
a plaintiff damages for pain and suffering. 4
Courts in the United States have been hesitant to adopt separate damage
awards for shortened life expectancy or loss of enjoyment of life.45 Generally,
38. Gammell v. Wilson [1980] 2 All E.R. 557, 567-68.
39. See Gammell v. Wilson [1981] 1 All E.R. 578, 588, 590 & 595 (affirming Court of
Appeal in Gammel, [1980] 2 All E.R. 577). Although the £ 1250 damage award for loss of
expectation of life was not before the House of Lords on appeal in Gammell, the House of
Lords expressed disfavor with any loss of expectation of life damages. Id. at 590.
40. See Administration of Justice Act, 1982, ch. 53, § I (provisions for personal injury
and wrongful death), reprinted in 13 HASBURY'S STATnrs OF ENGLAND 542-45 (4th ed. 1985);
infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing Administration of Justice Act of 1982).
41. Administration of Justice Act, 1982, ch. 53, § 1.
42. Id.; see 17 HAIsBURY'S STATuTrEs OF ENcLAND 314 (4th ed. 1986) (noting abolishment
of loss of expectation of life damages); J. Ci.aasc & W. LiNDSELL, supra note 34, at § 6-09
(15th ed. Supp. III 1985) (discussing abolishment of loss of expectation of life damages);
Borkowski & Stanton, The Administration of Justice Act 1982 (Parts I and III): Darning Old
Socks?, 46 MOD. L. REv. 191, 192-93 (1983) (noting abolishment of conventional award for
loss of expectation of life).
43. See Administration of Justice Act, 1982, ch. 53, § l(b). The Administration of Justice
Act requires a court to consider as an element of pain and suffering any suffering that the
awareness of shortened life expectancy causes an injured person. Id.; see also I H£sBuRy's
LAWS OF ENGLAND Damages, 1148 (4th ed. Supp. 1985) (noting that shortened life expectancy
may be element of pain and suffering).
44. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing abolishment of loss of
expectation of life as separate element of damages in English law).
45. See Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344, 347-48 (3d Cir.) (disapproving
shortened life expectancy damages), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 897 (1966). In Downie v. United
States Lines Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether
the plaintiff could recover damages for shortened life expectancy. Id. The plaintiff in Downie
contended that the defendant's servants and agents shortened the defendant's life expectancy
by aggravating a heart injury that the plaintiff had sustained aboard the defendant's ship. Id.
at 346. The plaintiff was a 52 year old seaman with a life expectancy of another 18 years. Id.
at 345. Reasoning that any attempt to place a value on life would be too speculative, the
Third Circuit reversed the district court's $25,000 shortened life expectancy damage award for
the plaintiff. Id. at 348. The Downie court held, however, that damages were appropriate for
the plaintiff's inability to pursue recreational or family activities that contribute to the
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United States courts that have recognized loss of enjoyment of life damages
have restricted the awards to actions that a living plaintiff brings to recover
compensation for the loss of the ability to enjoy particular avocations or
recreational activities. 46 At least one state, however, has recognized a separate
element of damages for a decedent's loss of the enjoyment of life when a
decedent's death is instantaneous. 47 In Katsetos v. Nolan,41 the Connecticut
Supreme Court considered a wrongful death action that arose from a
doctor's medical malpractice.49 The Katsetos court recognized that Con-
necticut law allows a decedent's estate to recover damages for a decedent's
enjoyment of life. Id. at 347.
The dissent in Downie argued that the shortening of life is a far greater injury than the
loss of the ability to enjoy recreational activities. Id. at 350 (Kalodner, J., dissenting).
Advocating the adoption of damages for shortened life expectancy, the Downie dissent rejected
the Downie court's holding that the loss of the ability to engage in life's activities is
compensable, while the loss of life is not. Id. at 350. While recognizing the difficulty in
assessing the value of lost years, the dissent in Downie stated that the jury's collective common
sense, judgment, and experience would provide reasonable awards for shortened life expectancy.
Id. at 351; see S. SPEISER, AmERIcAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:21 (1985) (noting near universal
rejection of shortened life expectancy damages in American courts). But see Schultleis &
Rheingold, Making Up For Lost Time: Recovering for Shortened Life Expectancy, TRuL,
Feb. 1983, at 44, 46-47 (advocating adoption of shortened life expectancy damages). Following
the Downie decision, at least two commentators have advocated shortened life expectancy
damages for a living plaintiff. See Note, supra note 33, at 39 (arguing for shortened life
expectancy as damage award for living plaintiff); Recent Developments, Damages-Compen-
sation for Curtailment of Life Expectancy as a Separate Element of Damages- Downie v.
United States Lines Co., 65 MicH. L. REv. 786, 790 (1967) (contending that living plaintiff
should recover damages for shortened life expectancy); infra note 46 and accompanying text
(discussing damages for loss of enjoyment of life).
46. See, e.g., Dyer v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 1266, 1280-84 (W.D. Mich. 1982)
(awarding injured plaintiff loss of enjoyment of life damages applying Michigan Law); Swiler
v. Baker's Super Market, Inc., 203 Neb. 183, __, 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (1979) (upholding trial
court jury instruction regarding loss of enjoyment of life damages for injured plaintiff);
Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 10-17 (Wyo. 1980) (holding that loss of enjoyment of life is
compensable injury for injured plaintiff); see also S. Speiser, supra note 45, at § 8:20 (discussing
personal injury damages for loss of enjoyment of life); Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment of
Life as a Distinct Element or Factor in Awarding Damages For Bodily Injury, 34 A.L.R. 4TH
293, 300-11 (1984) (discussing loss of enjoyment of life as separate element of damages for
injured plaintiff); Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life-Should it Be A Compensable Element
of Personal Injury Damages?, 11 Wake Forest L. Rev. 459, 471-72 (1975) (advocating
diminished enjoyment of life as separate element of damages for injured plaintiff); Comment,
Loss of Enjoyment of Life as an Element of Damages, 73 DicK L. REv. 639, 646 (1969)
(advocating adoption of loss of enjoyment of life damages as separate element of personal
injury damages).
47. See Kiniry v. Danbury Hospital, 183 Conn. 448, _ 439 A.2d 408, 414-15 (1981)
(holding that Connecticut law allows jury to consider decedent's loss of life and loss of ability
to enjoy life's activities in awarding damages); Waldron v. Raccio. 166 Conn. 608, -, 353 A.2d
770, 774-75 (1974) (holding that decedent's estate is entitled to compensation for decedent's
loss of ability to enjoy life's activities based on jury's evaluation of decedent's life and
activities).
48. 170 Conn. 637, -, 368 A.2d 172 (1976).
49. Id. at 175-77.
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loss of the ability to live and enjoy life's activities.50 In awarding such
damages, the court noted that the 41 year old decedent had a 73 year life
expectancy and discussed the many positive aspects of the decedent's life."
Dismissing the defendant's claim that a $400,000 general damage award was
excessive, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Katsetos held that the facts
concerning the decedent's life and activities supported the award.12 Thus,
damages for a decedent's loss of life and loss of the ability to enjoy life
are not unknown to state courts in the United States.53
In addition to the Connecticut Supreme Court, some federal courts have
fashioned damage remedies for a decedent's loss of life and loss of the
pleasure of living in section 1983 actions arising from the unconstitutional
deprivation of a decedent's life.5 4 These courts have justified such remedies
as facilitating either the compensatory or deterrent policies of section 1983,
or both.5 For example, in Bell v. City of Milwaukee,5 6 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the propriety of a
lower court jury verdict of $100,000 for a decedent's loss of life and loss
of the enjoyment of living. 57 The section 1983 action in Bell arose from the
unjustified police shooting and killing of Daniel Bell.5 8 Noting the policies
of compensation and deterrence underlying section 1983, the Seventh Circuit
held that Wisconsin law prohibiting damages for the loss of a decedent's
life interfered with the section 1983 policies of compensation and deter-
rence.59 In upholding the $100,000 award for the decedent's loss of life and
50. Id. at 183-84.
51. Id. at 184. The decedent in Kalsetos was married and had four children. Id. The
decedent was a licensed hairdresser and also worked in the family pizza business. Id. The
decedent was in good health until the time of her death. Id.
52. Id. The Katsetos court noted that the $400,000 general damage award for the
decedent's estate included lost future earnings, pain and suffering and loss of the ability to
enjoy life's activities. Id.
53. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (discussing damages in Connecticut for
loss of life and loss of ability to enjoy life's activities damages in Connecticut).
54. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1234-41 (7th Cir. 1984) (adopting
loss of life and loss of enjoyment of life damages); Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 159-
64 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (adopting hedonic damages for loss of life), appeal docketed, No. 85-3151
(7th Cir. Dec. 12, 1985); Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1555-58 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (fashioning "deterrent damages" for loss of life); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp.
1154, 1167-68 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (adopting loss of life damages).
55. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text (discussing compensatory and deterrent
policies of § 1983).
56. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
57. Id. at 1234.
58. Id. at 1214. The events giving rise to the § 1983 claim in Bell v. City of Milwaukee
occurred in 1958. Id. Police, however, concealed the facts surrounding the police killing of
Daniel Bell. Id. Bell's family and estate, therefore, did not file the § 1983 action and
accompanying civil rights claims until 1979, when the family discovered the coverup and the
true facts surrounding Bell's death. Id. at 1224.
59. Id. at 1236-41; see Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.01, 895.04 (West's 1983) (Wisconsin
wrongful death laws prohibiting damages for decedent's loss of life). In civil rights actions, §
1988 of title 42 of the United States Code requires federal courts to apply state law remedies,
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loss of the enjoyment of living, the Bell court stressed the deterrent effect
that damage awards for loss of life have on curbing official lawlessness. 6
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit in Bell differentiated between the deterrent
effect of loss of life damages and the punishing effect of punitive damages
in upholding a punitive damage award for the decedent's estate in addition
to the deterrent loss of life damage award. 6' Thus, the Seventh Circuit in
Bell recognized the Supreme Court's mandate in Carey that courts should
fashion section 1983 remedies to fit particular injuries and established a
remedy for the unconstitutional deprivation of life.6 2
Prior to the Bell court's fashioning of loss of life damages, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California in Guyton v.
Phillips63 considered whether a decedent's loss of life was a compensable
injury that survived for the decedent's estate in a section 1983 action. 64 The
action in Guyton arose when police unjustifiably used deadly force against
the decedent. 6 The Guyton court reasoned that the unjustified killing of
the decedent was an injury that required a remedy.6 6 The district court
maintained that federal courts have the authority to fashion remedies in
section 1983 actions to advance the section 1983 policies of compensation
and deterrence.6 7 Although the district court in Guyton recognized the
difficulty in assessing the value of life, the court held that loss of life
damages were not speculative.68 Deeming the use of economic factors such
unless the state law interferes with the purposes of federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); see
supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (discussing § 1988). In holding that Wisconsin law
interfered with the compensatory and deterrent policies of § 1983, the Seventh Circuit in Bell
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Carey v. Piphus which approved judicial
formulation of remedies when state law remedies are inappropriate. Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984); see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978) (federal
courts should formulate remedies in § 1983 actions when existing remedies are inappropriate);
supra text accompanying notes 16-23 (discussing Carey mandate for federal courts to formulate
appropriate remedies in § 1983 actions).
60. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1238-41. The Bell court noted that the fundamental purpose of §
1983 is to protect life. Id. at 1239. The Bell court reasoned that by ensuring that government
officials realize the potential cost of unjustified killing damages for loss of life deter uncon-
stitutional acts. Id.; see also infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (discussing difference
between deterrent effect of compensatory damages and punishing effect of punitive damages).
61. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1279-80. The Bell court upheld $25,000 in punitive damages against
the police officer who killed Daniel Bell. Id.
62. Id. at 1234-41; see supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh
Circuit's fashioning of loss of life and loss of enjoyment of living damages in Bell); see also
Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1189-90 (7th Cir. 1985) (reaffirming holding in Bell that
decedent's estate may recover loss of life damages in § 1983 actions).
63. 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
64. Id. at 1164-65.
65. Id. at 1156-59. In Guyton v. Phillips, police officers shot and killed the decedent, a
fourteen year old black male, allegedly after hearing gunshots and seeing the decedent point
a gun. Id. No evidence supported the police officers' allegations that the decedent pointed or
fired a gun. Id. at 1158.
66. Id. at 1167-68.
67. Id. at 1164-67.
68. Id. at 1168.
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as future earnings discriminatory and unrepresentative of the value of life,
the Guyton court determined that the most appropriate method for assessing
a monetary value of life would be a comparison of awards in other
unconstitutional .deprivation cases. 69 Before holding that $100,000 was a
reasonable award for the decedent's loss of life, the Guyton court considered
awards in cases arising from unconstitutional activity such as an unlawful
arrest, a violation of the right to vote, and a deprivation of the right to
practice religion. 70 The district court in Guyton, therefore, recognized that
the unjustified deprivation of life is the most serious constitutional violation
and deserves a substantial remedy.
71
While the Guyton court noted the compensatory and deterrent effects
of damages for a decedent's loss of life, the District Court for the Northern
District of California in Roman v. Richmond 2 specifically labeled loss of
life damages in a section 1983 action "deterrent damages. ' ' 73 The Roman
court considered a section 1983 claim arising when police unjustifiably used
deadly force against the decedent. 74 The Roman court noted that although
injured plaintiffs in section 1983 actions often recover substantial damages
for medical treatment, a decedent in a section 1983 action, whose death is
the result of unconstitutional activity, receives only limited damages. 7 The
district court in Roman maintained that the paradox of substantial damages
for an injured plaintiff and limited damages for a decedent renders killing
less expensive than injuring. 76 The court reasoned that a loss of life damage
remedy responsive to the unconstitutional deprivation of a decedent's life
would deter future unjustified killings. 77 Stressing the deterrent policy of
section 1983, the Roman court upheld a $1,500,000 general damage award
that included substantial loss of life deterrent damages.
7
69. Id. The Guyton court stated that the original purpose of § 1983 was to protect the
rights of blacks. Id. The court reasoned that because the economic status of blacks generally
is lower than that of whites, the use of economic factors to value life would racially discriminate
against blacks. Id. The Guyton court concluded, therefore, that using economic factors to
value life would defeat the historical purposes of § 1983. Id.; see supra note 2 and accompanying
text (discussing purposes of § 1983).
70. Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1168. The damage awards that the Guyton court considered
ranged from $750 to $10,000. Id.; see, e.g., Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 65-70 (8th Cir.
1919) (awarding $2000 for violation of plaintiff's right to vote); Bryant v. McGinnis, 463 F.
Supp. 373, 388 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (awarding $3000 for violation of prisoner's right to practice
religion); Krueger v. Miller, 489 F. Supp. 321, 383 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), aff'd 617 F.2d 603 (6th
Cir. 1980) (awarding $5250 for unlawful arrest).
71. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
72. 570 F. Supp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
73. Id. at 1556-58.
74. Id. at 1155-56.
75. Id. at 1557.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1556 & n.1. Noting that the jury awarded a $1,500,000 general damage award,
the Roman court maintained that the court could not determine what portion of the $1,500,000
award constituted deterrent damages. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 72-77 (discussing
deterrent damages in Roman).
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Rather than labeling section 1983 loss of life damages "deterrent dam-
ages," the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Sherrod v.
Berry79 awarded a decedent's estate hedonic damages for the value of the
decedent's lost life and lost pleasure of living. 0 The section 1983 claim in
Sherrod arose when a Joliet, Illinois police officer unjustifiably shot and
killed Ronald Sherrod.5 ' Sherrod died instantly.82 Sherrod, a nineteen year
old black male, had no prior criminal record.83 News reports and Sherrod's
death certificate, however, wrongly implicated Sherrod as a criminal sus-
pect. 84 Sherrod's family requested that the Joliet police chief clear Sherrod's
name of criminal implications and discipline the police officer who killed
Sherrod. 5 After the Joliet police chief refused to clear Sherrod's name or
discipline the officer, Sherrod's father instituted a section 1983 action against
the police officer who killed Sherrod, the police chief, and the City of
Joliet.8 6 Recognizing that compensation is the basic purpose of section 1983
damages, the district court in Sherrod instructed the jury to compensate the
estate of Ronald Sherrod for the value of Sherrod's life if the jury found
the defendants liable for violating Sherrod's fourteenth amendment right to
life.87 The jury in Sherrod found each defendant liable and awarded Sher-
rod's estate $850,000 for the "hedonic" value of Sherrod's life.88
The district court in Sherrod defined damages for the hedonic value of
a person's life as compensation for a person's loss of life and loss of the
pleasures of living.8 9 The court found that the phrase, "hedonic value of
life" encompasses the totality of a person's existence, which, accordinig to
the court, includes the economic, moral, and philosophical value that society
79. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-3151 (7th Cir. Dec. 12,
1985).
80. Id. at 162-64; see supra text accompanying notes 24-28 (discussing Sherrod as first
American court to label loss of life and loss of pleasures of living damages as damages for
"hedonic value" of decedent's life).
81. Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 160-62.
82. Id. at 162.
83. Id. at 160.
84. Id. at 162. At the time of his death, Sherrod was in the company of a robbery
suspect. Id. at 161. Sherrod, however, did not know that his passenger was a robbery suspect.
Id.
85. Id. at 162. The Sherrod court recounted that the police chief repeatedly refused to
clear Ronald Sherrod's name of criminal implications. Id. The court noted further that on at
least three occasions prior to the Sherrod killing, Joliet citizens complained that the police officer
who shot Sherrod used excessive force during confrontations with citizens. Id. The Sherrod
court noted that neither the police chief nor the City of Joliet disciplined the police officer
either on those three occasions or after the police officer killed Sherrod. Id.
86. Id. at 160, 162.
87. Id. at 160; see supra notes 6-7 (discussing deprivation of fourteenth amendment right
to life as actionable under § 1983).
88. Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 160; see Blodgett, supra note 27, at 25 (hedonic damages
redress deprivation of decedent's pleasure of living).
89. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162-63 (quoting economist's testimony in Sherrod
defining term "hedonic value of life").
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places on life.9° In addition, the Sherrod court maintained that a person's
enjoyment of activities in life and expectations of life's future prospects are
elements of the hedonic value of a person's life. 91 The Sherrod court
continued that although a person's economic status may relate to that
individual's pleasure of living, hedonic damages do not measure a person's
economic worth or future earnings capacity. 92 The Sherrod court, therefore,
found that hedonic damages require a subjective analysis of an individual's
life and the pleasure that the particular individual derived from living. 93
The testimony of Sherrod's family members enabled the jury in Sherrod
to analyze the hedonic value of Sherrod's life.94 Additionally, an economist
aided the Sherrod jury in translating the hedonic value of Sherrod's life
into a monetary value for the hedonic damage award. 95 In his testimony,
the economist summarized a number of economic studies that attempt to
value life in monetary terms. 96 The economic studies in Sherrod concerned
expenditures that government, private industry, and individuals are willing
90. See id. (defining hedonic value of life).
91. Id.
92. See id. (discussing hedonic damages in Sherrod). The economist in Sherrod, Stanley
V. Smith, President, Corporate Financial Group, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, stated that although
a person's economic worth is not the basis of hedonic damages, economists have found that
the hedonic value of a person's life ranges from 3 to 30 times a person's economic productive
income. Id. at 163 (discussing economist's testimony in Sherrod).
93. See id. at 164. The $850,000 hedonic damage award in Sherrod valued Sherrod's
life, not the value of human life generally or the value of Sherrod's constitutional right to
life. See id. at 162-64. This difference between the value of Sherrod's life and the value of
Sherrod's right to life is important because the United States Supreme Court has held that
federal courts cannot award § 1983 damages for the abstract value of a constitutional right.
See Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 54 U.S.L.W. 4771, 4774 (U.S. June 25,
1986) (holding that § 1983 damages for abstract value of constitutional right are invalid); see
also infra note 94 and accompanying text (noting evidence that enabled Sherrod jury subjectively
to analyze hedonic value of Sherrod's life).
94. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 160. The Sherrod court summarized the facts of
Sherrod's life enabling the Sherrod jury to evaluate the hedonic value of Sherrod's life. Id.
Sherrod had a high school education and was gainfully employed as a mechanic in his father's
auto repair shop which he was soon to take over as proprietor. Id. at 160-61. Further, Sherrod
had no past criminal record and the Sherrod family stated that Sherrod enjoyed life. Id. at
160.
95. See id. at 162-64 (discussing importance of economist's testimony in Sherrod con-
cerning hedonic value of life); infra text accompanying notes 96-99 (discussing economist's
testimony in Sherrod).
96. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 163-64. The Sherrod court noted several of these
economic studies that attempt to value life. See, e.g., S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH, EcONoMIc HANDBOOK § 12:5 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing possible relationship between a
person's earnings and value of person's life); Blomquist, The Value of Human life: An
Empirical Perspective, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 157, 158-63 (1981) (comparing value of life with
future earnings); Dardis, The Value of a Life: New Evidence from the Marketplace, 70 AM.
ECON. REv. 1077, 1078-82 (1980) (discussing relationship between value of life and consumers'
willingness to pay for personal injury risk reduction devices such as smoke detectors);
Linnerooth, The Value of Human Life: A Review of Models, 17 EcoN. INQUIRY 52, 55 (1979)
(noting that economic analyses of value of life are actually value of risk reduction analyses).
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to make to save or protect life.Y Basing his evaluation on these economic
studies, the economist in Sherrod concluded that the hedonic value of
Sherrod's life ranged from $1,200,000 to $12,000,000.98 Although the defend-
ants in Sherrod argued that both the $850,000 hedonic damage award and
the economist's testimony were speculative, the district court held that any
competent evidence which enabled the jury to determine damages was
admissable. 99
97. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 164 (citing economic studies that attempt to value
human life); supra note 96 and accompanying text (noting examples of economic studies
concerning the value of life). The record of the economist's testimony in Sherrod reflects the
economist's summary of economic studies concerning government expenditures to protect or
save a statistical life. These studies include United States military expenditures of $1,000,000
to save a life in a military aircraft, United States government expenditures of $1,200,000 to
save a life in a civilian aircraft, expenditures of $3,000,000 to install life saving air bags in
automobiles, and Department of Energy expenditures of up to $200,000,000 to save a life
during interstate transport of nuclear waste. Record at 55-61, Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D.
Il1. 1985). Recently, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) commissioned
a study to determine the value of a life. See Earley, What's A Life Worth?, WASH. POST
MAGAzNE I1I (June 9, 1985). The OSHA study considered workers' who take potentially fatal
risks at the workplace. Id. at 13, 36-37. The OSHA study first gathered data of high risk
occupations, using accident and death rate figures. Id. The study then compared these high
risk occupations with the compensation of workers in these occupations. Id. Although the
study showed that some workers in high risk occupations had a value of life of around
$650,000, OSHA established $3,500,000 as the value of a statistical life. Id.
History and religion also provide interesting examples of the value of life. Oliver Holmes,
Jr. once predicted that courts might imitate the Legis Barbarorum's tariff for life and limb in
estimating the value of a life to the community. 0. W. HoLMES, JR., The Path of the Law,
in THE CoMMON LAW AND OTHER WRrN=Gs 183-84 (1897). For example, under the sixth
century laws of English King Ethelberht, a slain man's life had a value with regard to the
man's class or rank in the feudal system. See THE LAws OF tHm EARLiEsT ENGousl KiNGs 5-7
(F.L. Attenborough ed. & trans. 1974). Ethelberht's laws required anyone who killed another
to pay money damages in the amount that the law recognized as the value of the decedent's
life. See id. at 97-99 (discussing laws of iEthelberht). Additionally, a ninth century treaty
between the English and the Danes included an agreement that recognized eight half-marks of
pure gold as the value of a slain man's life. See id. (discussing treaty between English King
Alfred and Danish King Guthrum). The same treaty valued slain commoners or freedmen at
two hundred shillings. See id. (discussing treaty between King Alfred and King Guthrum).
In addition to early English law, religion also provides insight into the value of life. See
Matthew 10:29-10:31 (Ryrie Study Bible New American Standard). In the New Testament,
Jesus Christ compared the value of man's life to the price of two sparrows, and concluded
that a man's life is worth much more than many sparrows. See id. (discussing Matthew's
recording of Jesus Christ's words). During the lifetime of Jesus Christ, two sparrows were
worth a penny, or one day's wages for a laborer. See id. at translator's note 10:29 (explaining
Jesus Christ's comparison of value of life and value of sparrows).
98. See Record at 55-61, Sherrod (recording economist's estimate of value of Sherrod's
life).
99. Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162, 164. Citing several cases as authority, the district
court in Sherrod concluded that the rule against speculative damages applies to speculation
surrounding the cause of the damages, rather than the speculation involved in measuring the
damage. Id. See Shannon v. Shaffer Oil & Refining Co., 51 F.2d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 1931)
(difficulty in assessing damages not grounds for denying damages); Calkins v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 27 F.2d 314, 319 (8th Cir. 1928) (damage recovery appropriate although existence, nature,
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Hedonic damages are an appropriate remedy in section 1983 actions
arising from the unconstitutional deprivation of a person's life. Although
section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for violations of a person's
constitutional rights, and federal courts have the authority to fashion section
1983 remedies, few federal courts have recognized that a person's loss of
life and loss of the pleasure of living is a compensable injury under section
1983.' 00 While federal courts have provided for various injuries alleged by
a decedent's estate or a decedent's beneficiaries in a section 1983 action
arising from an unconstitutional deprivation of a decedent's life, these
available remedies generally have failed to compensate a decedent's loss of
life and loss of the pleasure of living.10' To fill this vacuum in current
section 1983 remedies, federal courts should expand available section 1983
remedies to include damages for the hedonic value of a decedent's life.
Federal courts have derived the existing section 1983 remedies for the
unconstitutional deprivation of a person's life from state wrongful death
and survival action remedies in accordance with section 1988.'02 These
remedies include a decedent's lost future earnings, 03 pain and suffering
prior to death, 1 4 medical expenses incurred prior to death and funeral
or cause of damages may be uncertain); Crichfield v. Julia, 147 F. 65, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1906)
(rule against speculative damages concerns uncertainty of cause, not measurement of damages).
100. See supra'notes 1-7 (discussing § 1983 federal cause of action for violations of
constitutional rights); see supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text (discussing federal court's
authority to fashion § 1983 remedies); supra notes 45-46 (discussing American courts' general
rejection of loss of life damages); supra notes 48-99 and accompanying text (discussing state
and federal courts that have adopted loss of life damages).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 102-107 (discussing available § 1983 remedies).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12 (discussing § 1988); supra text accompanying
notes 16-23 (discussing federal courts' authority to fashion § 1983 remedies when state law is
inconsistent with purposes of § 1983).
103. See, e.g., Runyon v. District of Columbia, 463 F.2d 1319, 1321-23 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(estate of decedent may recover for decedent's lost future earnings); Weaver v. Ford Motor
Co., 382 F. Supp. 1068, 1076-77 (E.D. Pa.) (minor decedent's estate entitled to recover minor
decedent's lost future earnings) aff'd without opinion., 515 F.2d 506, 507 (3d Cir. 1974);
Balmer v. Dilley, 81 Wash. 2d 367, 370-71, 502 P.2d 456, 458-59 (1972) (decedent's estate
entitled to recover decedent's lost future earnings); see also 2 SPBISER, supra note 12 at § 14:7
(discussing recovery for decedent's lost future earnings under state survival and wrongful death
statutes); Annotation, Recovery of Value of Earnings Decedent Would Have Made After
Death, 76 A.L.R.3d 125, 127-37 (1977) (providing examples of recoveries for decedent's lost
future earnings under state survival and wrongful death law).
104. See, e.g., Poynor v. Cure, 443 So. 2d 1151, 1160-61 (La. Ct. App.) (decedent's
estate can recover for decedent's conscious pain and suffering, but not recover for pain and
suffering allowed when decedent's death is instantaneous), cert. denied, 446 So. 2d 1225, 1226
(La. 1983); Sheets v. Graco, Inc. 292 N.W.2d 63, 66-68 (N.D. 1980) (noting that decedent's
estate usually can recover for decedent's conscious pain and suffering prior to death); Heffner
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 265 Pa. Super. 181, 190, 401 A.2d 1160, 1164 (1979) (decedent's estate
can recover for decedent's conscious pain and suffering prior to death), aff'd 421 A.2d 629
(Pa. 1980); see also 2 SPEISER, supra note 12 at 14:8-12 (discussing recovery for pain and
suffering).
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expenses, 0 and a decedent's survivors' loss of the decedent's companion-
ship, love or affection.'06 With few exceptions, neither state nor federal
courts have awarded damages for loss of expectation of life, shortened life
expectancy, or loss of enjoyment of life when a decedent's death is instan-
taneous. 0 7 As the Sherrod court maintained, the value of a person's life is
larger than a person's economic worth or future earnings. 10 The Sherrod
court awarded hedonic damages to compensate the decedent's estate for the
decedent's loss of the larger value of life, which is the loss of the pleasure
of living, that current section 1983 remedies fail to redress.' ° Hedonic
damages as defined in Sherrod, therefore, fill the vacuum in existing section
1983 remedies and ensure that a decedent's estate recovers compensation
for not only the decedent's lost economic potential and pain and suffering,
but also for the decedent's much greater injury of loss of life and loss of
the pleasure of living."
0
The chief criticism of damages for a decedent's loss of life and loss of
the pleasure of living, is that a dead person is unable to enjoy the benefit
of such. damages and, therefore, the decedent's estate receives an unwar-
ranted windfall."' Under the legal fiction of a decedent's estate, however,
the estate stands in the place of and collects debts for the decedent." 2 A
wrongdoer who unconstitutionally deprives a person of life owes the dece-
105. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804(b) (1964) (providing for funeral
and medical expenses damage award for decedent's estate); Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (Vernon's
Supp. 1986) (providing for funeral and medical expenses damage award); OIK.A. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1053(B) (1987 Supp.) (providing for damage award for medical and burial expenses);
see also 2 SPEISER, supra note 12 at § 14:6 (discussing funeral and medical expenses damage
awards).
106. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1237 (5th Cir.
1986) (decedent's survivors entitled to damages for loss of decedent's love and affection); Platt
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 554 F. Supp. 360, 361 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (decedent's siblings
may recover damages for loss of decedent's society and companionship); Bullard v. Barnes,
102 Ill. 2d 505, 512-18, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1233-34 (1984) (parents may recover for loss of
decedent's society); see also 1 SPElSER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFuL DEATH 2D § 3:49 (1975)
(discussing damage awards for loss of society, affection, companionship and consortium).
107. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing American courts' treatment
of loss of enjoyment of life damages).
108. Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162-64; see supra text accompanying notes 89-99 (discussing
hedonic value of life).
109. Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162-64; see supra text accompanying notes 81-91 and
accompanying text (discussing basis for hedonic damage award in Sherrodc.
110. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text (discussing need to supplement
available § 1983 remedies with hedonic damages).
I11. See Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1983) (comatose plaintiff
unable to enjoy benefit of damages which compensate loss of ability to enjoy life), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); infra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing Flannery
court's objection to loss of ability to enjoy life damages); see also supra notes 45-46 and
accompanying text (discussing American courts' treatment of loss of enjoyment of life damages
and inability of decedent to enjoy benefit of loss of life damages).
112. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (discussing survival of § 1983 actions
and legal fiction of decedent's estate).
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dent redress. 113 A wrongdoer cannot return life to a decedent, and Anglo-
American law historically has recognized that a wrongdoer should pay
money damages for injuries that the wrongdoer has caused." 4 A hedonic
damage award, therefore, ensures that a wrongdoer pays a decedent's estate,
which represents the decedent, the money damages that the wrongdoer owes
the decedent for depriving the decedent of life and the pleasure of living." 5
In addition to the general propriety of an estate's recovery of damages
for a decedent, federal courts specifically have allowed some injuries that
a decedent suffers to survive the decedent's death as a compensable injury
for the benefit of the decedent's estate. ' 6 Under section 1988 of title 42 of
the United States Code, federal courts apply the available damage remedies
and survival of action laws of the state in which the cause of action arose
in section 1983 actions." 7 The majority of states allow a decedent's estate
to recover damages for a decedent's pain and suffering prior to death." 8
In a section 1983 action, therefore, a decedent's estate recovers damages
for a decedent's pain and suffering prior to death if a decedent's cause of
action arose in a state that allows a decedent's pain and suffering claim to
survive the decedent's death." 9 In addition to pain and suffering, several
states allow a decedent's estate to recover damages for a decedent's loss of
future earnings when a wrongdoer kills the decedent. 20 Federal courts,
therefore, will award a decedent's estate the decedent's lost future earnings
in a section 1983 action arising in a state that considers a decedent's loss
of future earnings a compensable injury.'2' Further, the Supreme Court
decision in Carey v. Piphus authorizes federal courts to fashion remedies
113. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1167 (discussing necessity for remedy for deprivation
of a person's life).
114. See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGEs 21-24 (1935) (discussing origins of money damages in
English law); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArAND, TE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 523-34 (1968 ed.)
(discussing growth of money damages in civil actions in English law).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 79-101 (discussing compensation that hedonic
damages afford decedent through decedent's estate).
116. See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing survival of pain and
suffering and loss of earnings damage claims in § 1983 actions).
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (federal courts apply state law remedies in § 1983
actions); supra text accompanying notes 9-12 (discussing provisions of § 1988).
118. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing pain and suffering prior to
death as recoverable claim in majority of state jurisdictions).
119. See Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 166-72 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding
$100,000 jury verdict for decedent's pain and suffering prior to death in § 1983 action). In
Guyton v. Phillips, the court allowed the jury to award $15,000 to the decedent's estate for
the decedent's pain and suffering prior to death, despite state law that prohibited pain and
suffering damages for a decedent's estate. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. 1154 at 1166-67 (N.D.Cal.
1981); supra text accompanying notes 63-71 (discussing Guyton).
120. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing survival of decedent's lost
future earnings for benefit of decedent's estate).
121. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 160, 164 (awarding $300,000 for economic loss to
decedent's estate); supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing decedent's lost future
earnings as damages for decedent's estate).
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in section 1983 actions when state law remedies are inadequate. 122 Thus,
substantial precedent exists for federal courts to allow damages for the
hedonic value of a decedent's life to survive for the decedent's estate.
23
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has held that compensation
is the basic purpose of section 1983 remedies.1 24 By awarding hedonic
damages, federal courts will compensate a decedent's actual injury of loss
of life and loss of the pleasure of living. 125 Federal courts rejecting hedonic
damages ignore the protection that the United States Constitution affords
a person's right to life. 26 Moreover, the survival of section 1983 claims and
the legal fiction of a decedent's estate allows the wrongdoer to compensate
a decedent for the decedent's loss of life and loss of the pleasure of living. 27
Hedonic damages, therefore, ensure that the federal courts fulfill the section
1983 policy of compensation for actual injury.
In addition to providing compensation for a decedent's loss of life and
loss of the pleasure of living, hedonic damages may also deter unlawful
conduct resulting in a person's death."' The United States Supreme Court
in Carey recognized that deterrence is inherent in substantial compensatory
damages. 29 Arguably, a wrongdoer is not cognizant of damage awards in
a section 1983 action when the wrongdoer unconstitutionally deprives a
person of life. 130 Substantial hedonic damage awards, however, place gov-
ernmental law enforcement agencies on notice that a decedent's estate will
recover for unlawful conduct that causes a decedent's death. 3' For example,
122. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text (discussing Carey).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 116-22 (discussing survival of decedent's claims
for decedent's estate in § 1983 actions).
124. See Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 54 U.S.L.W. 4771, 4773 (U.S.
June 25, 1986) (reaffirming that compensation is basic purpose of § 1983 damages); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978) (maintaining that compensation is basic purpose of §
1983 remedies); see also supra text accompanying notes 16-23 (discussing Carey view that
compensation is basic purpose of § 1983 damages).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93 (discussing purpose of hedonic damages).
126. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (right to life, liberty and property); supra notes
6-7 and accompanying text (discussing fourteenth amendment protection of life).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13 (discussing survival of § 1983 actions and
legal fiction of decedent's estate).
128. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing
deterrence policy of § 1983 in awarding loss of life and loss of enjoyment of life damages);
Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1556-58 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (stressing importance
of deterrence in awarding § 1983 loss of life deterrent damages); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F.
Supp. 1154, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (discussing need for § 1983 loss of life damages to deter
future unlawful conduct).
129. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978) (formidable deterrent inherent in
substantial compensatory damages); see also supra text accompanying notes 16-23 (discussing
holding in Carey).
130. Cf. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers, 87 YAiE L.J. 447, 464-67 (1978) (discussing
need to strengthen deterrence effect of § 1983 damages); Project, Suing the Police in Federal
Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 810-18 (1979) (discussing deterrence effect of § 1983 damage awards).
131. Cf. Newman, supra note 130, at 464-67 (stressing need for § 1983 reform to strengthen
compensation and deterrence policies of § 1983); Project, supra note 130, at 814-18 (discussing
need for substantial damages to deter unlawful conduct).
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in Sherrod, the police officer who unjustifiably killed Sherrod had a history
of unwarranted abusive and violent conduct against citizens. 3 2 Neither Joliet
police officials nor the City of Joliet had disciplined the police officer for
this conduct.'33 Further, Joliet police officials refused to discipline the police
officer after the officer killed Sherrod without any justification. 's4 Because
the City of Joliet and the police officer were liable for the hedonic damage
award of $850,000, the hedonic damage award in Sherrod potentially will
deter future Joliet police misconduct and might ensure that city authorities
discipline police for unlawful conduct.'35 Despite the potential compensation
and deterrent effects of hedonic damages, at least one court and several
commentators have argued that damages for a decedent's shortened life
expectancy or loss of life and loss of the pleasure of living are punitive.
3 6
Although the difference between compensatory damages that have a deter-
rent effect and punitive damages that punish is not always distinct, the
intent of the damage award helps clarify whether the damage award is
compensatory or punitive.137 While compensatory damages compensate an
actual injury or loss and deter future misconduct, punitive damages punish
132. See Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 162 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (discussing police
officer's prior misconduct).
133. See id. (discussing city authorities' failure to discipline police officer for past
misconduct).
134. See id. (discussing city authorities' refusal to discipline police officer after officer
killed Sherrod.)
135. See id. at 159-60 (noting that jury verdict in Sherrod was against all defendants,
including police officer, police chief, and City of Joliet).
136. See Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 110-11 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1226 (1984). In Flannery, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered the propriety of a $1,300,000 lower court damage award for a comatose plaintiff's
"loss of the ability to enjoy life." Id. An automobile collision with a federal employee on
official government business rendered the plaintiff in Flannery permanently comatose. Id. at
110. The plaintiff's personal representative brought the action on behalf of the comatose
plaintiff under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982) (providing
for tort claims against federal government officials). Under the FTCA, the law of the state in
which the cause of action arose controls damage remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1982). The
FTCA, however, prohibits punitive damages. Id. at § 2674 (1982); see Flannery, 718 F.2d at
110-1 (noting that FTCA prohibits punitive damages). The Fourth Circuit held that while West
Virginia law allowed damages for loss of the ability to enjoy life, such damages were punitive
and, therefore, invalid under the FTCA. Id. at 111. The Flannery court reasoned that the
comatose plaintiff was unable to enjoy the benefits of the damage award and that the award
eventually would constitute a windfall to the plaintiff's estate upon the plaintiff's death. Id.
The Fourth Circuit noted that because the plaintiff could not enjoy the benefits of the award,
the damage award was punitive. Id.
The dissent in Flannery argued that the majority misconstrued the definition of punitive
damages. Id. at 114-15 (Hall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the purpose of punitive
damages is to exact retribution for or punish particularly wilful or malicious tortfeasors. Id.
The Flannery dissent concluded that damages for loss of the ability to enjoy life were for an
actual injury and were, therefore, outside the scope of punitive damages. Id.; see infra text
accompanying notes 137-39 (discussing punitive damages).
137. See infra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing punitive damages).
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a wrongdoer for a wrongdoer's misconduct." 8 The importance of the
difference between compensatory and punitive damages is not only that
Carey mandates that compensation is the primary purpose of section 1983
damages, but also that municipalities are immune from punitive damage
awards in section 1983 actions. 3 9 By emphasizing deterrence rather than
compensation in awarding loss of life damages, the district court in Roman
ignored the Carey standard that compensation is the purpose of section
1983 damages.Y°0 Further, the Roman court's emphasis on deterrence focused
on the wrongdoer's conduct, not the decedent's loss. The loss of life damages
in Roman, appear punitive in nature, thus conflicting with the compensatory
purpose of section 1983 damages and freeing the municipality from liabil-
ity. 14 ' Similarly, the Bell court stressed deterrence in awarding loss of life
and loss of the enjoyment of living damages. 42 Hedonic damages, however,
focus on the decedent's loss, rather than the wrongdoer's conduct. 4 3 In
awarding hedonic damages, therefore, federal courts should follow Sherrod
and focus on the hedonic value of the decedent's life, not the wrongdoer's
conduct. 114
Admittedly, federal courts may experience some difficulty in translating
the hedonic value of a person's life into monetary terms for a damage
138. See Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 493 (1875) (defining punitive
damages as damages for sake of public example for tortfeasors acting particularly wilfully,
intentionally, or with an "evil motive"); Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 811 (6th
Cir. 1978). In Kalavity, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit differentiated
between ordinary tort damages, which compensate and deter, and punitive damages, which
punish. Id. The Kalavity court stated that the deterrence effects of compensatory tort damages
do not render the damages punitive in nature. Id. The court defined punitive damages as a
form of retribution against a tortfeasor. Id. The Kalavity court, therefore, recognized the
difference between the deterrence effect of compensatory damages and the retributive purpose
of punitive damages. Id.
139. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981) (munici-
palities are immune from punitive damages in § 1983 actions); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
254-55 (1978) (compensation is basic purpose of § 1983 remedies); see also supra text
accompanying notes 16-23 (discussing Carey standard that compensation is basic purpose of §
1983 damages).
140. See Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1556-58 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(awarding deterrent damages for decedent's loss of life); supra text accompanying notes 72-78
(discussing deterrent damage award in Roman).
141. See Roman, 570 F. Supp. at 1556-58 (allowing jury to consider deterrence effect
damages for decedent's loss of life have on municipal officers unlawful conduct).
142. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1265-66 (7th Cir. 1984) (intimating
deterrent effect of damages for loss of life and loss of enjoyment of life damages); supra text
accompanying notes 56-62 (discussing loss of life and loss of enjoyment of life damages in
Bell).
143. See Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159,162-64 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (discussing and
defining hedonic damages); supra text accompanying notes 79-99 (discussing hedonic damages
award in Sherrod).
144. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162-64 (defining purpose of hedonic damages); supra
text accompanying notes 79-99 (discussing hedonic damage award in Sherrod).
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award.1 45 The English courts' experience with loss of expectation of life
damages provides insight into the difficulty of placing a value on human
life. 146 Federal courts, however, can find guidance in assessing -hedonic
damages from Sherrod and other federal courts that have awarded loss of
life and loss of the pleasure of living damages, as well as any state courts
that award similar damages. 47 Moreover, in the United States a jury is the
predominant trier of fact, and the amount that a decedent's estate receives
for the hedonic value of the decedent's life is a fact that normally a jury
will determine. 4 A jury assesses damages from personal knowledge, expert
testimony, and the court's jury instructions. 49 Just as courts require the
jury to assess damages for such intangible losses as pain and suffering or
loss of a decedent's love and affection, the jury can determine the hedonic
value of a decedent's life.
50
In determining the hedonic value of a decedent's life, the expert testi-
mony of an economist can aid a jury in assessing the hedonic value of a
decedent's life.' Although the economist's testimony in Sherrod placed the
hedonic value of a person's life far in excess of the eventual jury award,
the economist's testimony reflected various methods that economists employ
to value human life. 52 Expert economic testimony concerning the hedonic
value of a person's life, therefore, might provide a jury with the definition
of the term "hedonic value of life" and offer the jury some basis for
conceptualizing the value of a person's life. a5
The $1,200,000 to $12,000,000 range that the economist in Sherrod
propounded as economic estimates for the value of life might disturb critics
of excessive damage verdicts. 54 The loss of life and loss of the pleasure of
145. See supra notes 69-70, 94-99 and accompanying text (providing methods of deter-
mining value of life).
146. See supra notes 30-44 and accompanying text (discussing English courts' experience
with loss of expectation of life damages).
147. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162-64 (discussing economist's role in enabling jury to
determine hedonic value of decedent's life); supra text accompanying notes 48-99 and accom-
panying text (discussing various courts' loss of life damage awards).
148. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 114, at 24-28 (discussing evolution of role of jury
in determining damages); 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 12, at § 9:2 (discussing jury's discretion in
awarding damages).
149. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 114 at 24-28 (discussing jury findings based on
personal knowledge of jurors); 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 12, at § 9:2 (noting that jury assesses
damages using good sense and following instructions of court).
150. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (discussing jury awards for intangible
losses such as pain and suffering).
151. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162-64 (discussing economist's testimony in Sherrod).
152. See id. (discussing economist's testimony in Sherrod); supra note 96 (discussing
economic studies of value of life).
153. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162-64 (discussing economist's definition of hedonic
value of life and methods economists' employ to value human life).
154. See Record at 55-61, Sherrod (recording economist's testimony in Sherrod); Willard
& Davidson, Does the Tort System Need An Overhaul? 72 A.B.A.J. 36, 36-37 (July, 1986)
(debating need for tort reform); Houser & Pearlman, Should Pain and Suffering Awards Have
Statutory Limits?, 72 A.B.A.J. 34, 34 (May, 1986) (discussing debate over limitations on pain
and suffering awards).
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living damage verdicts that some federal courts have allowed, however,
range from $100,000 to $850,000.' 5 These awards fall far short of econo-
mists' estimates of the value of life, and exhibit courts' and juries' restraint
in assessing a potentially tremendous award. An arbitrary cap on hedonic
damages similar to the arbitrary figure that English courts established for
loss of expectation of life damages, therefore, is unnecessary. 56 In addition,
since section 1983 actions that arise when a wrongdoer deprives a decedent
of life usually involve some egregious conduct, an arbitrary damage cap on
hedonic damages might cause juries randomly to award the maximum
amount that some arbitrary cap might allow as punishment for the wrong-
doer, without analyzing subjectively the hedonic value of the decedent's life
for a compensatory award. Thus, an arbitrary cap on hedonic damages
would undermine the role of the jury and potentially distort the compen-
satory nature of hedonic damages. The unresolved and perhaps unwarranted
controversy surrounding tort damages should not interfere with the com-
pensation that hedonic damages afford a decedent's estate for a decedent's
loss of life and loss of the pleasure of living when a wrongdoer unconsti-
tutionally causes the decedent's death. Hedonic damages are an extremely
important addition to section 1983 remedies. Federal courts not only have
the authority, but also the obligation to adopt section 1983 remedies that
will ensure compensation for deprivations of individuals' constitutional
rights. Although no amount of compensation can restore life to a decedent,
hedonic damages are completely in accord with other money damages Anglo-
American law recognizes as appropriate when a wrongdoer causes a person
to suffer injury or death.
JOHN ANTHONY WILLIAMSON
155. See supra notes 56-99 and accompanying text (discussing loss of life and loss of
pleasure of living verdicts in § 1983 actions).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39 (discussing English courts' assessing loss of
expectation of life damages at conventional nominal sum).
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